CO129-018 - Others - 1846 — Page 525

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POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

favourable geographical position, and the proximity of Canton and Macao; it can never be a colony, on account of its small size, rocky, rugged, barren structure, its insal brious and depressing climate, and incapability of even producing food for its inhabitants for one week, it might be stated for one day, for our establishments, and its thieving piratical, worthless population, the refuse of China; and it cannot be made a fortification (even if England desired a fortification to protect nothing at the very extreme end of the Chinese empire), on account of the singular formation of hills and mountains, one commanding another, by reason of the proximity of the main land and of other islands; and further, from the difficulty, if not impossibility of keeping troops alive in Hong Kong, or, if alive, strong enough for active service: "it would be absurd to create and maintain a fortress for no object what- ever. Even if Chusan be not obtained, there can be no justifiable grounds for incurring the present unnecessarily large civil and military expenditure in Hong Kong.

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1st. This rock is no protection whatever to the trade of Canton; a stout frigate" at Whampoa, and a steamer off the factories at Canton, is a far more efficacious protection for our trade there than any garrison or fleet we could maintain at Hong Kong. The present position of the British representative and merchants at Canton, is in several respects worse than before the war: notwithstanding the large fleet and force we have at Hong Kong, our Consular establishment and merchants are subject to insult and even to violence if they move out of their houses, as recently shown; and in fact there is more freedom and respect for British subjects at any other of the Consular ports than at Canton, from whose city we are still debarred even entrance.

During the last three years, there have been frequent disturbances, tumults, and conflagrations affecting the life and property of Europeans, without the Cantonese caring about our position at Hong Kong. The Americans have a trade nearly half the amount of the British at Canton; but they require no island like Hong Kong. The occasional presence of one of their ships of war at Whampoa, is their only and best support and protection. Last year an American brig of war, the St. Lewis," off Canton, was more effectual in preserving British life and property, than Hong Kong, with a plenipotentiary, general, admiral, two regiments, and four ships of war!

2nd. In the event of another war with China, experience has shown that it may most rapidly and economically be terminated by a naval force; if it were resolved to employ soldiers, they must be sent from India, and any force we could keep at Hong Kong, would be utterly inefficient for any military invasion, or garrisoning of different cities in China, should, unfortunately, such a course be ever again adopted; but a few ships of war and steamers in the Yang-tze-kiang, would dictate peace in China, without even suspending our tea trade at Canton.

3rd. With regard to the protection of Hong Kong, should hostilities ensue with China, a local corps of 500 Malays and the “ Minden” 74, moored in the harbour with one tier of heavy guns and a complement of 200 marines and marine artillerymen, would be more than adequate to resist any military or naval force which the whole Government of China could send against Hong Kong. And as regards protection against

OF GOVERNMENT.

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any foreign power with whom England might hereafter possibly be at war, this barren rock by the above-mentioned force would have far more protection than Singapore, and other of our valuable possessions which have ten times the amount of property ashore and afloat to protect, that Hong Kong is ever likely to possess. There can therefore be no national advantage in expending life and treasure by the main- tenance of an European garrison at Hong Kong; and the island being as ill adapted for a commercial emporium or political position, as it is a military garrison, there are no justifiable grounds for the present unnecessarily large Governmental establishments; a lieutenant and colonel commandant, a colonial secretary, a recorder, police magistrate, harbour-master, chaplain, and their subordinates, would fulfil every requisite duty. Thus the civil charges would be reduced to a scale commensurate with the revenue, and by vesting a municipal authority in the respectable European residents, they would assess themselves, provide the funds for police, sewers, roads, &c., administer them more efficiently than Government could do, and avoid irritating petty legislation and interference.

The civil expenditure of Hong Kong, therefore, may be advanta- geously reduced from £50,000 to £12,000 or £15,000 per annum ; the military from £150,000 or £200,000 to £20,000 or £25,000 per annum; and the several million dollars now proposed so unnecessarily to be expended on civil and military works may be saved from utter waste. The Consular stations and staff in China, require revision in several ways, but especially in the expenditure; even if we keep open the ports of Ningpo, Foochoo, and Amoy, the Consulate and Superin- tendent of Trade department charges may, with advantage to the public service, be reduced from about £30,000 or £35,000 a-year, to £15,000 per annum.

It would be necessary to retain at Shanghai a consul, but at the other three ports a vice-consul at each would be sufficient, and the Superintendency of Trade department ought to be abolished, as its duties would be more efficiently done by a consul-general at Canton, with a supervising control. The consular salaries would be defrayed by bills drawn on the Lords of the Treasury. All correspondence would be direct between the Foreign Office and consul-general. At Ningpo, for instance, where no English vessel has traded for twelve months, and there is not one European merchant we have had during the last

year, a consul, a vice-consul, an interpreter (although the consul is a superior Chinese scholar), a surgeon, first and second consular assistant, &c. At Foochoo, where there is no trade, we have a consul, (a vice-consul is named to proceed there,) an interpreter, no surgeon (the Consul being a surgeon), and two consular assistants, &c.

At Amoy we have a consul, a vice-consul, a surgeon, consular assistants, &c. One efficient vice-consul would fulfil the duties, if there were ten times the amount of the present trade at Amoy. The following scale of consular establishment would be amply sufficient for our present trade and position in China:

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